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Abstract
  
Taking the role of frames into account may significantly add to the tools that have been 
developed for communication and learning on complex risks and benefits. As part of a larger 
multidisciplinary study into climate-related forms of sense-making this paper explores which 
frames are used by the citizens of Western European countries and, in particular, the 
Netherlands. Three recent multi-national public opinion surveys were analysed to examine 
beliefs about climate change in the context of beliefs about energy technology and concerns 
about other environmental issues, such as natural disasters. It appeared that many citizens had 
only vague ideas about the energy situation and that these do not constitute an unequivocal 
frame for climate issues. In contrast, the results suggest that the long-lasting rainfall and severe 
floods in Central Europe have had a significant impact. Climate change was often framed in a 
way that articulates its associations with rain- and river-based problems. This result is 
extremely important for risk communication, because especially in the Netherlands with its 
vulnerable coastal zones climate change may produce much more consequences than rain- and 
river-based problems only. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a topic that can be framed and reframed in many ways. In the early 1990s, for 
example, many citizens of the developed countries saw global climate change as an issue with 
potentially serious but geographically and psychologically distant consequences (Bord, Fisher, & 
O'Connor, 1998; Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 
1995). Since then, however, various salient events, such as unusually long-lasting rainfall and 
severe floods in Europe, may have contributed to a reframing of the issue in terms of 
consequences that are much closer to people's personal lives. This change may be happening 
through a process of formal and informal risk communication in which risks that were largely 
implicit are reframed into more explicit risks. As this process will not stop here, it is particularly 
important to get more insight into the frames that people use to make sense of climate-related 
issues. In general, sense-making is what people do to make things rationally accountable to 
themselves and others (Weick, 1995), and frames are underlying structures of belief, perception 
and appreciation (Schön & Rein, 1994) that mediate their understanding of the world. 
Accordingly, taking the role of frames into account may significantly add to the tools that have 
been developed for communication and learning on complex risks and benefits. As part of a 
larger multidisciplinary study into climate-related forms of sense-making this paper explores 
which frames are used by the citizens of different European countries and, in particular, the 
Netherlands. 
 
One of the primary reasons to study framing and sense-making is that these social-psychological 
processes may reveal how people's ongoing behaviour is shaped by the cultural and ecological 
circumstances in which they live. Framing and sense-making are crucial micro-mechanisms in 
the much bigger story of the continuous interactions between humans and the nonhuman natural 
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world. Because these processes take many years to develop, it is important to combine the 
short-term perspective of case studies with the long-term perspective provided by theoretical 
insights. Although the literature about frames and sense-making has not produced a complete 
theory, there is a set of properties (Weick, 1995) that altogether describe its main features. A 
very important property is that sense-making is inherently retrospective. In the process of 
making up their mind people will habitually look backwards, using distinctions and concepts that 
are familiar to them and that they share with their peers. Actually, most people are only 
discontinuously able and willing to re-examine and revise pre-existing concepts. Re-examination 
processes have to be triggered by special conditions, such as an unexpected event that stimulates 
people to modify their frames and create new ways of understanding (e.g. an awareness of 
multiple perspectives). Only if people become mindful of what they are doing (Langer, 1989), 
they may develop new concepts or new combinations of existing concepts, such as associations 
of climate change with specific types of danger. 
 
Another important aspect of sense-making is the often neglected discrepancy between what 
people think they are doing and what others see them do. This means that the frame of an actor is 
basically different from the frame of an observer. A risk-relevant example is the difference 
between the frame of people who are coping implicitly with a risk that is inherent in their line of 
behaviour, such as living below sea level, and the frame of an expert in risk analysis who isolates 
their risk and makes it more explicit. A direct comparison of the two frames can be very helpful 
for the choice of more adaptive behaviour, but it may also result in serious failures of risk 
communication. One of the communication problems is that people who are trying to make sense 
of what is happening around them are more interested in information about the plausibility of all 
kinds of options than in very precise calculations of one risk. A closely related problem is the 
difference between a conventional frequency-oriented frame and a more advanced probability-
oriented frame (Gigerenzer, 1991). A probability-oriented frame may not have to be changed if a 
low-probability flood happens, but a frequency-oriented frame is liable to sudden swings after 
such an event; a type of flood that was once implausible may seem very plausible now. 
 
Notions of what is plausible are not just affected by the frequency of events but also by their 
cultural associations. In the case of people's relationship with nature, a few moral ideas appear to 
have dominated the history of Europe. According to Glacken (1967), these refer to (1) the idea of 
a designed earth that constitutes a fit environment for man and other organic life, (2) the idea of 
geographical influence on the character of human culture ("geographical determinism"), and (3) 
the idea of man as a geographic agent who changed the earth from its hypothetical pristine 
condition. In the context of these associations, many unusual natural events were seen as cues 
that something unpleasant is going to happen ("omen of disaster"). During the Little Ice Age 
(from around 1300 until about 1730), for instance, certain "unnatural" climatic events were not 
only attributed to large scale deforestation but also to the weather-making abilities of witches 
(Behringer, 1999). In recent years, anthropogenic climate change has become one of the issues 
that may concern people in their moral role of responsible citizen or potential victim. However, 
due to the plausibility of various kinds of human impacts on the earth and the retrospective 
character of sense-making, many people seem to have confused the relatively new risk of climate 
change with more familiar environmental risks, such as the depletion of the ozone layer, that 
were brought to their attention in an earlier stage (Bostrom et al., 1994). 
 
Research into frames should always focus on meaningful comparisons between different sites 
where sense-making happens. In the case of climate change, for example, more insight into 
sense-making can be gained by comparing people who live in areas with different ecological and 
cultural circumstances. Interestingly, several recent multi-national public opinion surveys allow 
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us to make such comparisons. This refers to some large data sets, such as the Eurobarometer 
surveys of the European Union, which are not specifically built for research into beliefs about 
climate change but which can fruitfully be used for that purpose. A particular advantage of the 
data sets is that beliefs about climate change can be examined in the context of beliefs about 
energy technology and concerns about other environmental issues, such as ozone depletion and 
natural disasters. Although some data sets include a large number of countries, it was decided to 
focus the analysis on the countries that belong to the Roman Catholic and Protestant cultural 
zones of Western Europe (i.e. the former EU 15 countries minus Greece plus Norway and 
Switzerland). In addition to the multi-national surveys, a Dutch survey will be analysed to 
explore what citizens think about one particular climate-related issue in the Netherlands, namely 
the development of large-scale water reservoirs in the next decades. 
 
METHODS 
Three data sets were chosen that allow us to put climate-related sense-making by the citizens of 
Western European countries in a broader energy and environment perspective. These are (1) the 
International Social Survey Program (not including Italy, France, Belgium, Luxembourg), 
largely conducted in 2000 by independent institutions in each country and focused on attitudes 
toward the environment (ISSP, 2003); (2) parts of Eurobarometer 57 (not including Norway and 
Switzerland), conducted between 23 February and 4 April 2002 and focused on attitudes towards 
energy and energy technology (European Commission, 2003); and (3) parts of Eurobarometer 58 
(not including Switzerland), conducted between 1 September 2002 and 7 October 2002 (after the 
August 2002 flooding in the Elbe and the Danube catchment areas) and focused on attitudes 
towards the environment (European Commission, 2002). The data sets were documented and 
made available by the "Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Köln". From each set, the 
most relevant questions about climate-related beliefs and concerns were taken. 
 
Clearly, multi-national data should be handled with great care. A crucial methodological point is 
that each country should be seen as a set of conditions, such as latitude, language, religion, 
education, and wealth (Scheuch, 1989), which makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly how the 
differences between the countries should be explained. In addition, differences in public opinion 
between countries are often less stable than the sample sizes (approximately 1000 persons per 
country) may suggest. To check for flaws, more than one data set should be used. Comparisons 
may also be hampered by differences in language and ways in which people answer survey 
questions. For instance, questions that are intended to measure people's level of concern about 
environmental issues may generate a tendency to show a certain degree of concern about all the 
issues. In Europe, this tendency may be more widespread in the countries of the south than in 
those of the north (European Commission, 2002). Therefore, several statistical techniques will be 
applied to adjust the scores for differences in response tendencies. A useful technique is multiple 
regression analysis to transform the degree of concern about climate change into standardized 
residuals that are made independent from concerns about environmental pollution in general. 
Multidimensional scaling by PROXSCALE (SPSS, 2003) is also a relevant technique, as the 
results are not influenced by overall score level differences in different groups.  
 
The final part of the analysis focuses on expectations for the future. In 2004, the Social and 
Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands gathered data about expectations of the Dutch 
population for the year 2020 (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2006). The expectations were 
measured as perceived probabilities of particular changes in national and global wealth, safety, 
energy technology, immigration policy, and spatial planning (i.e. the development of large-scale 
water reservoirs). The data were analysed by multidimensional scaling to explore the positions of 
the climate-related topics. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
One of the potentially relevant frames to make sense of climate change refers to beliefs about the 
energy situation. The answers to questions in ISSP 2000 and Eurobarometer 57 show that many 
people in Western Europe took the issue of climate change seriously and that they saw a 
connection with the use of fossil fuels. This connection was confirmed by more than 80% of the 
citizens in five of the countries (second column of Table 1). Although this indicates at least some 
general understanding of the issue, it should be added that there were also associations that 
indicate confusion. In agreement with earlier work, it appears that a majority of the citizens in 
almost all the countries still confused climate change with the depletion of the ozone layer (third 
column of Table 1). Moreover, many citizens had the opinion that nuclear power also contributes 
to global warming (fourth column of Table 1). Explicit denial of this impact was higher in 
countries in the north where the average level of education is higher, but in these countries as 
well a large percentage agreed (fifth column of Table 1; overall, the correlation between length 
of education and agreement–disagreement with this item is .17 (N= 15036)). The results 
underline the conclusion that many citizens of the European Union have only vague ideas about 
the energy situation (European Commission, 2003); it should be added that these beliefs do not 
seem to constitute a very useful frame to make sense of climate change. 
 
Table 1 Beliefs about climate change and the energy situation 
 
Country and cultural 
zone1) 
Greenhouse 
effect caused 
by the use of 
coal, oil, gas2) 
(% agree) 
Greenhouse 
effect caused 
by a hole in 
the earth's 
atmosphere3) 
(% agree) 
Nuclear power 
contributes to 
global 
warming4) 
(% agree) 
Nuclear power 
contributes to 
global 
warming5) 
(% disagree) 
Portugal (a) 68% 62% 59% 10% 
Spain (a) 65% 57% 64% 9% 
Italy (a)   42% 22% 
France (a)   57% 26% 
Belgium (a)   48% 27% 
Ireland (b) 80% 79% 61% 11% 
Luxembourg (b)   57% 27% 
Austria (b) 79% 66% 41% 32% 
Switzerland (c) 83% 55%   
Germany (c) 76% 69% 39% 35% 
Netherlands (c) 74% 49% 34% 46% 
United Kingdom (c) 80% 72% 45% 27% 
Denmark (d) 75% 50% 24% 58% 
Norway (d) 80% 53%   
Sweden (d) 81% 48% 20% 67% 
Finland (e) 64% 48% 28% 54% 
1) (a) Romanic language, Catholic; (b) German language, Catholic; (c) German language, mixed religion; 
(d) German language, Protestant; (e) Finns (N= about 1000 persons per country). 
2) % agree with ISSP 2000 Question 9f, "Every time we use coal or oil or gas we contribute to the 
greenhouse effect." 
3) % agree with ISSP 2000 Question 9e, "The greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the earth's 
atmosphere."  
4) % agree and 5) % disagree with Eurobarometer 57 (Spring 2002) Question 9, "Nuclear power 
contributes significantly to global warming and climate change." 
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Another way of viewing climate issues is by putting them in the context of all the main 
environmental issues of our times. In Eurobarometer 58, respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of worry about 23 environmental issues, ranging from "destruction of the ozone layer" to 
"industrial waste management." The technique of multidimensional scaling was used to place 
related worries together and non-related worries further apart. In the solution presented in Figure 
1, four dividing lines were drawn on the basis of another analysis (Principal Component Analysis 
with oblique rotation of the first four correlated components; all Eigenvalues >1). The results of 
Figure 1 indicate that there were clear patterns of worries among the citizens of the countries 
involved. In fact, all the environmental worries can be arranged in four broad clusters, which 
may be characterised as follows. Water pollution (e.g. rivers, coasts, ground and tap water) and 
industrial disasters (e.g. oil spills) make up the first cluster. The second one refers to some global 
issues and includes climate change together with natural disasters and the ozone issue. The third 
cluster contains local issues and topics that appear to worry urban people in particular (e.g. 
hunting). The fourth cluster largely involves worries about chemicals and waste. 
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Figure 1 Multidimensional scaling of the worries taken from Eurobarometer 58 (N= 16054). 
 
The information presented in Figure 1 were used to shed more light on the relative level of worry 
about climate change and natural disasters, given people's level of worry about other kinds of 
environmental issues. A similar but more simplified analysis was done with the ISSP data set, as 
five other pollution-related worries were included in the ISSP questionnaire. The results are 
summarized in Table 2. It appears that the level of worry about climate change was relatively 
high in the countries of Central Europe, both in 2000 and in 2002 (second and third columns of 
Table 2). Moreover, this pattern of results corresponds with higher levels of worry about natural 
disasters and higher correlations between the worries (fourth and fifth columns of Table 2). 
  76
Table 2 Relative levels of worry about climate change and natural disasters 
 
Country and cultural 
zone1) 
ISSP in 2000: 
Climate 
change 
dangerous2) 
Eurobarometer
2002: Worry 
about climate 
change3) 
Eurobarometer
2002: Worry 
about natural 
disasters4) 
Partial 
correlations 
climate change 
and natural 
disasters5) 
Portugal (a) .037 .086 .163 .231 
Spain (a) .076 -.035 .116 .143 
Italy (a) . .123 -.035 .104 
France (a) . -.001 .124 .354 
Belgium (a) . -.130 .016 .287 
Ireland (b) .041 -.305 -.303 .096 
Luxembourg (b) . .104 .183 .329 
Austria (b) .289 .217 .337 .306 
Switzerland (c) .387 . .  
Germany (c) .338 .354 .513 .378 
Netherlands (c) .015 -.076 -.067 .292 
United Kingdom (c) -.022 -.301 -.348 .168 
Denmark (d) -.227 -.189 -.354 .243 
Norway (d) -.169 -.100 -.365 .154 
Sweden (d) -.191 .067 -.271 .129 
Finland (e) -.168 -.042 -.074 .166 
1) See note 1 of Table 1. N = about 1000 persons per country. 
2) Standardized residuals of the answers to ISSP 2000 Question 12, "In general, do you think that a rise in 
the world's temperature caused by the greenhouse effect is: 1 extremely dangerous for the environment 
(..), 5 not dangerous at all for the environment," given people's level of concern about pollution-related 
issues. 
3) Standardized residuals of the answers to Eurobarometer 58 (Autumn 2002), Question 39.2, "At present, 
are you very worried, fairly worried, not very worried or not at all worried about climate change," given 
people's level of worry about pollution, chemicals and local issues. 
4) Standardized residuals of the answers to Eurobarometer 58 (Autumn 2002), Question 39.7, "At present, 
are you very worried, fairly worried, not very worried or not at all worried about natural disasters," given 
people's level of worry about pollution, chemicals and local issues 
5) Partial correlations between worry about climate change and about natural disasters, given people's 
level of worry about water pollution, chemicals and local issues. 
 
The results of Table 2 should be seen in relation to the long-lasting rainfall and severe floods that 
have stricken Central Europe since 1990. These events may have had a significant impact on 
people's worries about climate change. Among the citizens of countries as Austria and Germany, 
the levels of worry about climate change and natural disaster were relatively high and both items 
were significantly correlated. In these and other countries (but not in the Netherlands) worry 
about natural disasters was higher in rural areas than in large towns. Interestingly, another spatial 
pattern was found in the 12 provinces of the Netherlands. Table 3 shows that the highest 
correlations between worry about climate change and natural disasters were found in the 
provinces that are river-oriented (North-Brabant, Limburg) instead of coast-oriented (Groningen, 
Friesland, North and South Holland, Zeeland). This outcome is not really surprising, as the past 
decade has revealed that certain parts of the Netherlands are very vulnerable to river-based 
floods. However, especially in the lowlands with their long coastline, climate change may have 
much more consequences than rain- and river-based problems only. 
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Table 3 Worry about climate change and natural disasters, correlations in 12 Dutch provinces 
 
Western provinces  Central axis Eastern provinces 
Name Correlation Name Correlation Name Correlation 
  Friesland 
(N=34) 
r= .272 Groningen 
(N=32) 
r= .187 
 
North-
Holland 
(N=155) 
r= .251 Flevoland 
(N=12) 
Overijssel 
(N=62) 
r= .303 
 
r= .392 
Drente 
(N=69) 
r= .200 
 
South-
Holland 
(N=209) 
r= .223 Utrecht 
(N=64) 
r= .332 Gelderland 
(N=115) 
r= .164 
 
Zeeland 
(N=19) 
r= .129 North- 
Brabant 
(N=143) 
r= .431 Limburg 
(N=69) 
r= .405 
 
One of the options that are considered by policy makers in the Netherlands is the development of 
large-scale water reservoirs in lowland areas that can function as buffers for shortages and 
overflows. The option was included in the survey about expectations for the year 2020, measured 
as perceived probabilities of changes in wealth, safety, energy technology, immigration policy, 
and spatial planning. The multidimensional scale analysis of the data produced a horizontal 
probability dimension and a vertical optimism-pessimism dimension (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Expectations of a Dutch sample for the year 2020 after scaling (N= 2234) 
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The horizontal dimension of Figure 2 shows that the Dutch citizens considered the 
introduction of firm road pricing as very probable but a revival of religion as very improbable. 
As the vertical dimension demonstrates, they considered technological solutions, including a 
breakthrough of alternative energy sources, as distinct from pessimistic expectancies, such as 
undue pressure of housing and recreation on Dutch nature. On average the development of large-
scale water reservoirs in lowland areas got a relatively neutral position; it was not part of the 
optimistic expectancies nor of the real pessimistic ones, and it was not considered very probable. 
In fact, the results suggest that many citizens have still to make up their mind about the 
relationship between climate change and spatial planning. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The surveys have produced valuable insights into climate-relevant sense-making. One of the 
potentially relevant frames refers to energy, but it appeared that many citizens of Western 
European countries had only vague ideas about the energy situation. In contrast, the results 
suggest that the long-lasting rainfall and severe floods in Central Europe have had a significant 
impact. Climate change was often framed in a way that articulates its associations with rain- and 
river-based problems. This result is extremely important for risk communication, because 
especially in the Netherlands climate change may produce much more consequences than rain- 
and river-based problems only. Many Dutch citizens have still to make up their mind about the 
relationship between climate change and spatial planning. 
 
REFERENCES 
Behringer, W. (1999). Climatic change and witch-hunting: the impact of the Little Ice Age on mentalities. 
Climatic Change, 43, 335-351. 
Bord, R. J., Fisher, A., & O'Connor, R. E. (1998). Public perceptions of global warming: United States 
and international perspectives. Climate Research, 11, 75-84. 
Bostrom, A., Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., & Read, D. (1994). What do people know about global 
climate change? 1. Mental models. Risk Analysis, 14, 959-970. 
European Commission (2002). Eurobarometer 58.0: the attitudes of Europeans towards the environment. 
Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General Environment. 
European Commission (2003). Eurobarometer. Energy: issues, options and technologies. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: beyond 'heuristics and biases'. In W. 
Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 83-115). 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Glacken, C. J. (1967). Traces on the Rhodian shore; nature and culture in western thought from ancient 
times to the end of the 18th century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
ISSP (2003). International Social Survey Programme, ISSP 2000 Environment II, ZA No. 3440. Köln: 
Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, http://www.gesis.org/ZA/. 
Kempton, W., Boster, J. S., & Hartley, J. A. (1995). Environmental values in American culture. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Langer, E. J. (1989). Minding matters: the consequences of mindlessness-mindfulness. In L. Berkowitz 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 22, pp. 137-173). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press. 
Scheuch, E. K. (1989). Theoretical implications of comparative survey-research - why the wheel of cross-
cultural methodology keeps on being reinvented. International Sociology, 4, 147-167. 
Schön, D. A. & Rein, M. (1994). Frame reflection: toward the resolution of intractable policy 
controversies. New York: Basic Books. 
Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (2006). Onderzoek toekomstverwachtingen 2004 [computerfile] 
(Expectations of the Dutch population for the year 2020). Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archives 
(P1649). 
SPSS (2003). Release 12.0. Chicago, Il: SPSS Inc. 
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
